5Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)                         W. Kumari
 
6Request for Comments: 8914                                        Google
 
7Category: Standards Track                                        E. Hunt
 
22   This document defines an extensible method to return additional
 
23   information about the cause of DNS errors.  Though created primarily
 
24   to extend SERVFAIL to provide additional information about the cause
 
25   of DNS and DNSSEC failures, the Extended DNS Errors option defined in
 
26   this document allows all response types to contain extended error
 
27   information.  Extended DNS Error information does not change the
 
32   This is an Internet Standards Track document.
 
34   This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
 
35   (IETF).  It represents the consensus of the IETF community.  It has
 
36   received public review and has been approved for publication by the
 
37   Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG).  Further information on
 
38   Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 7841.
 
40   Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
 
41   and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
 
42   https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8914.
 
46   Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
 
47   document authors.  All rights reserved.
 
49   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
 
50   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
 
51   (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
 
52   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
 
53   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
 
54   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
 
55   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
 
56   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
 
57   described in the Simplified BSD License.
 
61   1.  Introduction and Background
 
62     1.1.  Requirements Notation
 
63   2.  Extended DNS Error EDNS0 Option Format
 
64   3.  Extended DNS Error Processing
 
65   4.  Defined Extended DNS Errors
 
66     4.1.  Extended DNS Error Code 0 - Other
 
67     4.2.  Extended DNS Error Code 1 - Unsupported DNSKEY Algorithm
 
68     4.3.  Extended DNS Error Code 2 - Unsupported DS Digest Type
 
69     4.4.  Extended DNS Error Code 3 - Stale Answer
 
70     4.5.  Extended DNS Error Code 4 - Forged Answer
 
71     4.6.  Extended DNS Error Code 5 - DNSSEC Indeterminate
 
72     4.7.  Extended DNS Error Code 6 - DNSSEC Bogus
 
73     4.8.  Extended DNS Error Code 7 - Signature Expired
 
74     4.9.  Extended DNS Error Code 8 - Signature Not Yet Valid
 
75     4.10. Extended DNS Error Code 9 - DNSKEY Missing
 
76     4.11. Extended DNS Error Code 10 - RRSIGs Missing
 
77     4.12. Extended DNS Error Code 11 - No Zone Key Bit Set
 
78     4.13. Extended DNS Error Code 12 - NSEC Missing
 
79     4.14. Extended DNS Error Code 13 - Cached Error
 
80     4.15. Extended DNS Error Code 14 - Not Ready
 
81     4.16. Extended DNS Error Code 15 - Blocked
 
82     4.17. Extended DNS Error Code 16 - Censored
 
83     4.18. Extended DNS Error Code 17 - Filtered
 
84     4.19. Extended DNS Error Code 18 - Prohibited
 
85     4.20. Extended DNS Error Code 19 - Stale NXDOMAIN Answer
 
86     4.21. Extended DNS Error Code 20 - Not Authoritative
 
87     4.22. Extended DNS Error Code 21 - Not Supported
 
88     4.23. Extended DNS Error Code 22 - No Reachable Authority
 
89     4.24. Extended DNS Error Code 23 - Network Error
 
90     4.25. Extended DNS Error Code 24 - Invalid Data
 
91   5.  IANA Considerations
 
92     5.1.  A New Extended DNS Error Code EDNS Option
 
93     5.2.  New Registry for Extended DNS Error Codes
 
94   6.  Security Considerations
 
96     7.1.  Normative References
 
97     7.2.  Informative References
 
1011.  Introduction and Background
 
103   There are many reasons that a DNS query may fail -- some of them
 
104   transient, some permanent; some can be resolved by querying another
 
105   server, some are likely best handled by stopping resolution.
 
106   Unfortunately, the error signals that a DNS server can return are
 
107   very limited and are not very expressive.  This means that
 
108   applications and resolvers often have to "guess" at what the issue
 
109   is, e.g., was the answer marked REFUSED because of a lame delegation
 
110   or because the nameserver is still starting up and loading zones?  Is
 
111   a SERVFAIL a DNSSEC validation issue, or is the nameserver
 
112   experiencing some other failure?  What error messages should be
 
113   presented to the user or logged under these conditions?
 
115   A good example of issues that would benefit from additional error
 
116   information are errors caused by DNSSEC validation issues.  When a
 
117   stub resolver queries a name that is DNSSEC bogus [RFC8499] (using a
 
118   validating resolver), the stub resolver receives only a SERVFAIL in
 
119   response.  Unfortunately, the SERVFAIL Response Code (RCODE) is used
 
120   to signal many sorts of DNS errors, and so the stub resolver's only
 
121   option is to ask the next configured DNS resolver.  The result of
 
122   trying the next resolver is one of two outcomes: either the next
 
123   resolver also validates and a SERVFAIL is returned again or the next
 
124   resolver is not a validating resolver and the user is returned a
 
125   potentially harmful result.  With an Extended DNS Error (EDE) option
 
126   enclosed in the response message, the resolver is able to return a
 
127   more descriptive reason as to why any failures happened or add
 
128   additional context to a message containing a NOERROR RCODE.
 
130   This document specifies a mechanism to extend DNS errors to provide
 
131   additional information about the cause of an error.  The Extended DNS
 
132   Error codes described in this document can be used by any system that
 
133   sends DNS queries and receives a response containing an EDE option.
 
134   Different codes are useful in different circumstances, and thus
 
135   different systems (stub resolvers, recursive resolvers, and
 
136   authoritative resolvers) might receive and use them.
 
1381.1.  Requirements Notation
 
140   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
 
141   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
 
142   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
 
143   BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
 
144   capitals, as shown here.
 
1462.  Extended DNS Error EDNS0 Option Format
 
148   This document uses an Extended Mechanism for DNS (EDNS0) [RFC6891]
 
149   option to include Extended DNS Error (EDE) information in DNS
 
150   messages.  The option is structured as follows:
 
153        0   1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9   0   1   2   3   4   5
 
154      +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
 
156      +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
 
158      +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
 
160      +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
 
161   6: / EXTRA-TEXT ...                                                /
 
162      +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
 
165   Field definition details:
 
168      2 octets / 16 bits (defined in [RFC6891]) contains the value 15
 
172      2 octets / 16 bits (defined in [RFC6891]) contains the length of
 
173      the payload (everything after OPTION-LENGTH) in octets and should
 
174      be 2 plus the length of the EXTRA-TEXT field (which may be a zero-
 
178      16 bits, which is the principal contribution of this document.
 
179      This 16-bit value, encoded in network most significant bit (MSB)
 
180      byte order, provides the additional context for the RESPONSE-CODE
 
181      of the DNS message.  The INFO-CODE serves as an index into the
 
182      "Extended DNS Errors" registry, defined and created in
 
186      a variable-length, UTF-8-encoded [RFC5198] text field that may
 
187      hold additional textual information.  This information is intended
 
188      for human consumption (not automated parsing).  EDE text may be
 
189      null terminated but MUST NOT be assumed to be; the length MUST be
 
190      derived from the OPTION-LENGTH field.  The EXTRA-TEXT field may be
 
191      zero octets in length, indicating that there is no EXTRA-TEXT
 
192      included.  Care should be taken not to include private information
 
193      in the EXTRA-TEXT field that an observer would not otherwise have
 
194      access to, such as account numbers.
 
196   The Extended DNS Error (EDE) option can be included in any response
 
197   (SERVFAIL, NXDOMAIN, REFUSED, even NOERROR, etc.) to a query that
 
198   includes an OPT pseudo-RR [RFC6891].  This document includes a set of
 
199   initial codepoints but is extensible via the IANA registry defined
 
200   and created in Section 5.2.
 
2023.  Extended DNS Error Processing
 
204   When the response grows beyond the requestor's UDP payload size
 
205   [RFC6891], servers SHOULD truncate messages by dropping EDE options
 
206   before dropping other data from packets.  Implementations SHOULD set
 
207   the truncation bit when dropping EDE options.  Because long EXTRA-
 
208   TEXT fields may trigger truncation (which is undesirable given the
 
209   supplemental nature of EDE), implementers and operators creating EDE
 
210   options SHOULD avoid lengthy EXTRA-TEXT contents.
 
212   When a resolver or forwarder receives an EDE option, whether or not
 
213   (and how) to pass along EDE information on to their original client
 
214   is implementation dependent.  Implementations MAY choose to not
 
215   forward information, or they MAY choose to create a new EDE option(s)
 
216   that conveys the information encoded in the received EDE.  When doing
 
217   so, the source of the error SHOULD be attributed in the EXTRA-TEXT
 
218   field, since an EDNS0 option received by the original client will
 
219   appear to have come from the resolver or forwarder sending it.
 
221   This document does not allow or prohibit any particular extended
 
222   error codes and information to be matched with any particular RCODEs.
 
223   Some combinations of extended error codes and RCODEs may seem
 
224   nonsensical (such as resolver-specific extended error codes received
 
225   in responses from authoritative servers), so systems interpreting the
 
226   extended error codes MUST NOT assume that a combination will make
 
227   sense.  Receivers MUST be able to accept EDE codes and EXTRA-TEXT in
 
228   all messages, including those with a NOERROR RCODE but need not act
 
229   on them.  Applications MUST continue to follow requirements from
 
230   applicable specifications on how to process RCODEs no matter what EDE
 
231   values are also received.  Senders MAY include more than one EDE
 
232   option and receivers MUST be able to accept (but not necessarily
 
233   process or act on) multiple EDE options in a DNS message.
 
2354.  Defined Extended DNS Errors
 
237   This document defines some initial EDE codes.  The mechanism is
 
238   intended to be extensible, and additional codepoints can be
 
239   registered in the "Extended DNS Errors" registry (Section 5.2).  The
 
240   INFO-CODE from the EDE EDNS option is used to serve as an index into
 
241   the "Extended DNS Error" IANA registry, the initial values for which
 
242   are defined in the following subsections.
 
2444.1.  Extended DNS Error Code 0 - Other
 
246   The error in question falls into a category that does not match known
 
247   extended error codes.  Implementations SHOULD include an EXTRA-TEXT
 
248   value to augment this error code with additional information.
 
2504.2.  Extended DNS Error Code 1 - Unsupported DNSKEY Algorithm
 
252   The resolver attempted to perform DNSSEC validation, but a DNSKEY
 
253   RRset contained only unsupported DNSSEC algorithms.
 
2554.3.  Extended DNS Error Code 2 - Unsupported DS Digest Type
 
257   The resolver attempted to perform DNSSEC validation, but a DS RRset
 
258   contained only unsupported Digest Types.
 
2604.4.  Extended DNS Error Code 3 - Stale Answer
 
262   The resolver was unable to resolve the answer within its time limits
 
263   and decided to answer with previously cached data instead of
 
264   answering with an error.  This is typically caused by problems
 
265   communicating with an authoritative server, possibly as result of a
 
266   denial of service (DoS) attack against another network.  (See also
 
2694.5.  Extended DNS Error Code 4 - Forged Answer
 
271   For policy reasons (legal obligation or malware filtering, for
 
272   instance), an answer was forged.  Note that this should be used when
 
273   an answer is still provided, not when failure codes are returned
 
274   instead.  See Blocked (15), Censored (16), and Filtered (17) for use
 
275   when returning other response codes.
 
2774.6.  Extended DNS Error Code 5 - DNSSEC Indeterminate
 
279   The resolver attempted to perform DNSSEC validation, but validation
 
280   ended in the Indeterminate state [RFC4035].
 
2824.7.  Extended DNS Error Code 6 - DNSSEC Bogus
 
284   The resolver attempted to perform DNSSEC validation, but validation
 
285   ended in the Bogus state.
 
2874.8.  Extended DNS Error Code 7 - Signature Expired
 
289   The resolver attempted to perform DNSSEC validation, but no
 
290   signatures are presently valid and some (often all) are expired.
 
2924.9.  Extended DNS Error Code 8 - Signature Not Yet Valid
 
294   The resolver attempted to perform DNSSEC validation, but no
 
295   signatures are presently valid and at least some are not yet valid.
 
2974.10.  Extended DNS Error Code 9 - DNSKEY Missing
 
299   A DS record existed at a parent, but no supported matching DNSKEY
 
300   record could be found for the child.
 
3024.11.  Extended DNS Error Code 10 - RRSIGs Missing
 
304   The resolver attempted to perform DNSSEC validation, but no RRSIGs
 
305   could be found for at least one RRset where RRSIGs were expected.
 
3074.12.  Extended DNS Error Code 11 - No Zone Key Bit Set
 
309   The resolver attempted to perform DNSSEC validation, but no Zone Key
 
310   Bit was set in a DNSKEY.
 
3124.13.  Extended DNS Error Code 12 - NSEC Missing
 
314   The resolver attempted to perform DNSSEC validation, but the
 
315   requested data was missing and a covering NSEC or NSEC3 was not
 
3184.14.  Extended DNS Error Code 13 - Cached Error
 
320   The resolver is returning the SERVFAIL RCODE from its cache.
 
3224.15.  Extended DNS Error Code 14 - Not Ready
 
324   The server is unable to answer the query, as it was not fully
 
325   functional when the query was received.
 
3274.16.  Extended DNS Error Code 15 - Blocked
 
329   The server is unable to respond to the request because the domain is
 
330   on a blocklist due to an internal security policy imposed by the
 
331   operator of the server resolving or forwarding the query.
 
3334.17.  Extended DNS Error Code 16 - Censored
 
335   The server is unable to respond to the request because the domain is
 
336   on a blocklist due to an external requirement imposed by an entity
 
337   other than the operator of the server resolving or forwarding the
 
338   query.  Note that how the imposed policy is applied is irrelevant
 
339   (in-band DNS filtering, court order, etc.).
 
3414.18.  Extended DNS Error Code 17 - Filtered
 
343   The server is unable to respond to the request because the domain is
 
344   on a blocklist as requested by the client.  Functionally, this
 
345   amounts to "you requested that we filter domains like this one."
 
3474.19.  Extended DNS Error Code 18 - Prohibited
 
349   An authoritative server or recursive resolver that receives a query
 
350   from an "unauthorized" client can annotate its REFUSED message with
 
351   this code.  Examples of "unauthorized" clients are recursive queries
 
352   from IP addresses outside the network, blocklisted IP addresses,
 
3554.20.  Extended DNS Error Code 19 - Stale NXDOMAIN Answer
 
357   The resolver was unable to resolve an answer within its configured
 
358   time limits and decided to answer with a previously cached NXDOMAIN
 
359   answer instead of answering with an error.  This may be caused, for
 
360   example, by problems communicating with an authoritative server,
 
361   possibly as result of a denial of service (DoS) attack against
 
362   another network.  (See also Code 3.)
 
3644.21.  Extended DNS Error Code 20 - Not Authoritative
 
366   An authoritative server that receives a query with the Recursion
 
367   Desired (RD) bit clear, or when it is not configured for recursion
 
368   for a domain for which it is not authoritative, SHOULD include this
 
369   EDE code in the REFUSED response.  A resolver that receives a query
 
370   with the RD bit clear SHOULD include this EDE code in the REFUSED
 
3734.22.  Extended DNS Error Code 21 - Not Supported
 
375   The requested operation or query is not supported.
 
3774.23.  Extended DNS Error Code 22 - No Reachable Authority
 
379   The resolver could not reach any of the authoritative name servers
 
380   (or they potentially refused to reply).
 
3824.24.  Extended DNS Error Code 23 - Network Error
 
384   An unrecoverable error occurred while communicating with another
 
3874.25.  Extended DNS Error Code 24 - Invalid Data
 
389   The authoritative server cannot answer with data for a zone it is
 
390   otherwise configured to support.  Examples of this include its most
 
391   recent zone being too old or having expired.
 
3935.  IANA Considerations
 
3955.1.  A New Extended DNS Error Code EDNS Option
 
397   This document defines a new EDNS(0) option, entitled "Extended DNS
 
398   Error", with the assigned value of 15 from the "DNS EDNS0 Option
 
399   Codes (OPT)" registry:
 
401           +=======+====================+==========+===========+
 
402           | Value | Name               | Status   | Reference |
 
403           +=======+====================+==========+===========+
 
404           | 15    | Extended DNS Error | Standard | RFC 8914  |
 
405           +-------+--------------------+----------+-----------+
 
4095.2.  New Registry for Extended DNS Error Codes
 
411   IANA has created and will maintain a new registry called "Extended
 
412   DNS Error Codes" on the "Domain Name System (DNS) Parameters" web
 
415                +===============+=========================+
 
416                | Range         | Registration Procedures |
 
417                +===============+=========================+
 
418                | 0 - 49151     | First Come First Served |
 
419                +---------------+-------------------------+
 
420                | 49152 - 65535 | Private Use             |
 
421                +---------------+-------------------------+
 
425   The "Extended DNS Error Codes" registry is a table with three
 
426   columns: INFO-CODE, Purpose, and Reference.  The initial content is
 
429      +=============+==============================+===============+
 
430      | INFO-CODE   | Purpose                      | Reference     |
 
431      +=============+==============================+===============+
 
432      | 0           | Other Error                  | Section 4.1   |
 
433      +-------------+------------------------------+---------------+
 
434      | 1           | Unsupported DNSKEY Algorithm | Section 4.2   |
 
435      +-------------+------------------------------+---------------+
 
436      | 2           | Unsupported DS Digest Type   | Section 4.3   |
 
437      +-------------+------------------------------+---------------+
 
438      | 3           | Stale Answer                 | Section 4.4   |
 
439      |             |                              | and [RFC8767] |
 
440      +-------------+------------------------------+---------------+
 
441      | 4           | Forged Answer                | Section 4.5   |
 
442      +-------------+------------------------------+---------------+
 
443      | 5           | DNSSEC Indeterminate         | Section 4.6   |
 
444      +-------------+------------------------------+---------------+
 
445      | 6           | DNSSEC Bogus                 | Section 4.7   |
 
446      +-------------+------------------------------+---------------+
 
447      | 7           | Signature Expired            | Section 4.8   |
 
448      +-------------+------------------------------+---------------+
 
449      | 8           | Signature Not Yet Valid      | Section 4.9   |
 
450      +-------------+------------------------------+---------------+
 
451      | 9           | DNSKEY Missing               | Section 4.10  |
 
452      +-------------+------------------------------+---------------+
 
453      | 10          | RRSIGs Missing               | Section 4.11  |
 
454      +-------------+------------------------------+---------------+
 
455      | 11          | No Zone Key Bit Set          | Section 4.12  |
 
456      +-------------+------------------------------+---------------+
 
457      | 12          | NSEC Missing                 | Section 4.13  |
 
458      +-------------+------------------------------+---------------+
 
459      | 13          | Cached Error                 | Section 4.14  |
 
460      +-------------+------------------------------+---------------+
 
461      | 14          | Not Ready                    | Section 4.15  |
 
462      +-------------+------------------------------+---------------+
 
463      | 15          | Blocked                      | Section 4.16  |
 
464      +-------------+------------------------------+---------------+
 
465      | 16          | Censored                     | Section 4.17  |
 
466      +-------------+------------------------------+---------------+
 
467      | 17          | Filtered                     | Section 4.18  |
 
468      +-------------+------------------------------+---------------+
 
469      | 18          | Prohibited                   | Section 4.19  |
 
470      +-------------+------------------------------+---------------+
 
471      | 19          | Stale NXDomain Answer        | Section 4.20  |
 
472      +-------------+------------------------------+---------------+
 
473      | 20          | Not Authoritative            | Section 4.21  |
 
474      +-------------+------------------------------+---------------+
 
475      | 21          | Not Supported                | Section 4.22  |
 
476      +-------------+------------------------------+---------------+
 
477      | 22          | No Reachable Authority       | Section 4.23  |
 
478      +-------------+------------------------------+---------------+
 
479      | 23          | Network Error                | Section 4.24  |
 
480      +-------------+------------------------------+---------------+
 
481      | 24          | Invalid Data                 | Section 4.25  |
 
482      +-------------+------------------------------+---------------+
 
483      | 25-49151    | Unassigned                   |               |
 
484      +-------------+------------------------------+---------------+
 
485      | 49152-65535 | Reserved for Private Use     | Section 5.2   |
 
486      +-------------+------------------------------+---------------+
 
4906.  Security Considerations
 
492   Though DNSSEC continues to be deployed, unfortunately a significant
 
493   number of clients (~11% according to [GeoffValidation]) that receive
 
494   a SERVFAIL from a validating resolver because of a DNSSEC validation
 
495   issue will simply ask the next (potentially non-validating) resolver
 
496   in their list and thus don't get the protections that DNSSEC should
 
499   EDE information is unauthenticated information, unless secured by a
 
500   form of secured DNS transaction, such as [RFC2845], [RFC2931],
 
501   [RFC8094], or [RFC8484].  An attacker (e.g., a man in the middle
 
502   (MITM) or malicious recursive server) could insert an extended error
 
503   response into untrusted data -- although, ideally, clients and
 
504   resolvers would not trust any unauthenticated information.  As such,
 
505   EDE content should be treated only as diagnostic information and MUST
 
506   NOT alter DNS protocol processing.  Until all DNS answers are
 
507   authenticated via DNSSEC or the other mechanisms mentioned above,
 
508   there are some trade-offs.  As an example, an attacker who is able to
 
509   insert the DNSSEC Bogus Extended Error into a DNS message could
 
510   instead simply reply with a fictitious address (A or AAAA) record.
 
511   Note that DNS RCODEs also contain no authentication and can be just
 
512   as easily manipulated.
 
514   By design, EDE potentially exposes additional information via DNS
 
515   resolution processes that may leak information.  An example of this
 
516   is the Prohibited EDE code (18), which may leak the fact that the
 
517   name is on a blocklist.
 
5217.1.  Normative References
 
523   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
 
524              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
 
525              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
 
526              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
 
528   [RFC4035]  Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S.
 
529              Rose, "Protocol Modifications for the DNS Security
 
530              Extensions", RFC 4035, DOI 10.17487/RFC4035, March 2005,
 
531              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4035>.
 
533   [RFC5198]  Klensin, J. and M. Padlipsky, "Unicode Format for Network
 
534              Interchange", RFC 5198, DOI 10.17487/RFC5198, March 2008,
 
535              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5198>.
 
537   [RFC6891]  Damas, J., Graff, M., and P. Vixie, "Extension Mechanisms
 
538              for DNS (EDNS(0))", STD 75, RFC 6891,
 
539              DOI 10.17487/RFC6891, April 2013,
 
540              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6891>.
 
542   [RFC8174]  Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
 
543              2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
 
544              May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
 
546   [RFC8499]  Hoffman, P., Sullivan, A., and K. Fujiwara, "DNS
 
547              Terminology", BCP 219, RFC 8499, DOI 10.17487/RFC8499,
 
548              January 2019, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8499>.
 
550   [RFC8767]  Lawrence, D., Kumari, W., and P. Sood, "Serving Stale Data
 
551              to Improve DNS Resiliency", RFC 8767,
 
552              DOI 10.17487/RFC8767, March 2020,
 
553              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8767>.
 
5557.2.  Informative References
 
558              Huston, G., "A quick review of DNSSEC Validation in
 
559              today's Internet", June 2016, <http://www.potaroo.net/
 
560              presentations/2016-06-27-dnssec.pdf>.
 
562   [RFC2845]  Vixie, P., Gudmundsson, O., Eastlake 3rd, D., and B.
 
563              Wellington, "Secret Key Transaction Authentication for DNS
 
564              (TSIG)", RFC 2845, DOI 10.17487/RFC2845, May 2000,
 
565              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2845>.
 
567   [RFC2931]  Eastlake 3rd, D., "DNS Request and Transaction Signatures
 
568              ( SIG(0)s )", RFC 2931, DOI 10.17487/RFC2931, September
 
569              2000, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2931>.
 
571   [RFC8094]  Reddy, T., Wing, D., and P. Patil, "DNS over Datagram
 
572              Transport Layer Security (DTLS)", RFC 8094,
 
573              DOI 10.17487/RFC8094, February 2017,
 
574              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8094>.
 
576   [RFC8484]  Hoffman, P. and P. McManus, "DNS Queries over HTTPS
 
577              (DoH)", RFC 8484, DOI 10.17487/RFC8484, October 2018,
 
578              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8484>.
 
582   The authors wish to thank Joe Abley, Mark Andrews, Tim April,
 
583   Vittorio Bertola, Stephane Bortzmeyer, Vladimir Cunat, Ralph Dolmans,
 
584   Peter DeVries, Peter van Dijk, Mats Dufberg, Donald Eastlake, Bob
 
585   Harold, Paul Hoffman, Geoff Huston, Shane Kerr, Edward Lewis, Carlos
 
586   M. Martinez, George Michelson, Eric Orth, Michael Sheldon, Puneet
 
587   Sood, Petr Spacek, Ondrej Sury, John Todd, Loganaden Velvindron, and
 
588   Paul Vixie.  They also vaguely remember discussing this with a number
 
589   of people over the years but have forgotten who all of them were.
 
590   Apologies if we forgot to acknowledge your contributions.
 
592   One author also wants to thank the band Infected Mushroom for
 
593   providing a good background soundtrack.  Another author would like to
 
594   thank the band Mushroom Infectors.  This was funny at the time we
 
595   wrote it, but we cannot remember why...
 
601   1600 Amphitheatre Parkway
 
602   Mountain View, CA 94043
 
603   United States of America
 
605   Email: warren@kumari.net
 
611   Redwood City, CA 94063
 
612   United States of America
 
620   Email: roy.arends@icann.org
 
627   United States of America
 
629   Email: ietf@hardakers.net
 
635   San Francisco, CA 94105
 
636   United States of America